Domain Spoofing

An email from a .gov or a police department address carries weight with the person who reads it. Domain spoofing borrows that weight for a sender who has no connection to the agency.

The two forms

The first form forges the sender address on a real domain. The message claims to come from the agency’s own domain, and it was sent from a server the agency never authorised.

The second form registers a lookalike domain, such as a name with one letter changed or an agency name under a different ending. The sender then owns that domain and can set up its mail correctly.

What email authentication checks

  • SPF lets a domain’s owner publish which hosts are allowed to send mail using its name, and a receiving server checks the sending host against that list.
  • DKIM attaches a cryptographic signature that the signing domain’s owner takes responsibility for. The receiver checks it against a public key published in the domain’s DNS records.
  • DMARC checks that the domain in the visible From address aligns with a domain that passed SPF or DKIM. It also lets the domain owner publish a policy for messages that fail.

These checks catch the first form when the real domain publishes them. A forged message fails, and the owner’s DMARC policy tells the receiver what to do with it. A lookalike domain passes its own authentication, because its owner published the records for it.

Forged sender addressLookalike domainCompromised account
Where the mail comes fromA server the real domain never authorisedA different domain registered by the senderThe agency’s own mail system
Passes SPF, DKIM and DMARCNo, when the real domain publishes themYes, for the lookalike’s own domainYes
What catches itAuthentication results on the real domainReading the full domain and checking who holds itConfirming the person through a channel independent of the email

What to look at

  • The full domain, read character by character, including the part after the last dot.
  • The reply-to address, which can differ from the sender address.
  • The age of the domain and who registered it.
  • Whether the domain is a restricted government domain.

The .gov domain is administered by CISA’s .gov registry, which verifies that a registrant is a US government organisation (federal, state, local or tribal). A lookalike such as a similarly spelled .com or .org name sits outside that restriction.

How it differs from an email compromise

In a law enforcement email compromise, an attacker controls a real agency account. The mail comes from the real domain and passes every authentication check, so a domain check has nothing to flag.

Frequently asked questions

What is domain spoofing?

It is sending email from an address made to look like it belongs to a government or police agency. The sender either forges the address on a real domain or registers a lookalike domain. Either way the aim is to make a request for user data look as though it came from an official source.

Do SPF, DKIM and DMARC stop a spoofed police domain?

They catch a forged address on a real domain that publishes them, because the message fails the checks. A lookalike domain passes its own authentication, since its registrant sets up the records. Authentication shows which domain sent the mail, and the person behind that domain needs a check of their own.

How is domain spoofing different from an email compromise?

In domain spoofing the mail comes from a forged address or a lookalike domain. In an email compromise the attacker controls a genuine agency account, so the mail comes from the real domain and passes every authentication check. Confirming the person through an independent channel is the check that works on both.

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