An email from a .gov or a police department address carries weight with the person who reads it. Domain spoofing borrows that weight for a sender who has no connection to the agency.
The two forms
The first form forges the sender address on a real domain. The message claims to come from the agency’s own domain, and it was sent from a server the agency never authorised.
The second form registers a lookalike domain, such as a name with one letter changed or an agency name under a different ending. The sender then owns that domain and can set up its mail correctly.
What email authentication checks
- SPF lets a domain’s owner publish which hosts are allowed to send mail using its name, and a receiving server checks the sending host against that list.
- DKIM attaches a cryptographic signature that the signing domain’s owner takes responsibility for. The receiver checks it against a public key published in the domain’s DNS records.
- DMARC checks that the domain in the visible From address aligns with a domain that passed SPF or DKIM. It also lets the domain owner publish a policy for messages that fail.
These checks catch the first form when the real domain publishes them. A forged message fails, and the owner’s DMARC policy tells the receiver what to do with it. A lookalike domain passes its own authentication, because its owner published the records for it.
| Forged sender address | Lookalike domain | Compromised account | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Where the mail comes from | A server the real domain never authorised | A different domain registered by the sender | The agency’s own mail system |
| Passes SPF, DKIM and DMARC | No, when the real domain publishes them | Yes, for the lookalike’s own domain | Yes |
| What catches it | Authentication results on the real domain | Reading the full domain and checking who holds it | Confirming the person through a channel independent of the email |
What to look at
- The full domain, read character by character, including the part after the last dot.
- The reply-to address, which can differ from the sender address.
- The age of the domain and who registered it.
- Whether the domain is a restricted government domain.
The .gov domain is administered by CISA’s .gov registry, which verifies that a registrant is a US government organisation (federal, state, local or tribal). A lookalike such as a similarly spelled .com or .org name sits outside that restriction.
How it differs from an email compromise
In a law enforcement email compromise, an attacker controls a real agency account. The mail comes from the real domain and passes every authentication check, so a domain check has nothing to flag.